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Metzke: Constitutional Law - Equal Protection Analysis - Awarding Public
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Equal Protection Analysis. Awarding Public Works
Contracts: Granting Preference to Resident Bidders. Galesburg Construction Co. v. Board of Trustees, 641 P.2d 745 (Wyo. 1982).

Galesburg Construction Company was incorporated under the laws of Wyoming in June of 1981. In July of that
year, the Board of Trustees of Memorial Hospital of Converse County invited bids for a construction project. Galesburg Construction was revealed to be the low bidder at the
August 27th bid opening. On September 14, 1981, Galesburg
was informed by the hospital board that it did not qualify as
a resident bidder under section 9-8-301' of the Wyoming
Statutes. The next lowest bidder, however, had qualified as
a resident under the statute. Because the bid of the resident
had not exceeded the bid of Galesburg by more than five per-'
cent, Galesburg was told that the contract would be awarded
to the resident bidder as directed by section 9-8-3022 of the
Wyoming Statutes. In response, Galesburg filed suit in the
District Court of Converse County asking that section 9-8302 of the Wyoming Statutes be declared unconstitutional.
The constitutional question3 was reserved to the Wyoming
Supreme Court.' The Wyoming Supreme Court evaluated
Copyright@ 1983 by the Unrversity of Wyoming.

1. WYO. STAT. § 9-8-301 (1977) provides:
As used in this act [§§ 9-8-301 to 9-8-304, 9-8-308] the word "resident"
means any person who shall have been a bona fide resident of the state
for one (1) year or more immediately prior to bidding upon the contract;
a partnership or association, each member of which shall have been a bona
fide resident of the state for one (1) year or more immediately prior to
bidding upon the contract; a corporation which has been organized under
the laws of the State of Wyoming and has been in existence therein for
one (1) year or more immediately prior to bidding upon the contract and
which has its principal office and place of business within the State of
Wyoming.
2. WYO. STAT. § 9-8-302 (1977) provides:
Whenever a contract is let by the state, or any department thereof, or
any county, city, town, school distr'ct, high school district, or other public
corporation of the state for the erection, construction, alteration, or repair
of any public building, or other public structure, or for making any addition thereto, or for any public work or improvements, such contract shall
be let, if advertisement for bids is not required, to a resident of the state.
If advertisement for bids is required the contract shall be let to the responsible resident making the lowest bid if such resident's bid is not more than
five percent (5%) higher than that of the lowest responsible nonresident
bidder.
3. Whether section 9-8-302 of the Wyoming Statutes violates article I, section
6, of the Wyoming Constitution, and/or article 1, section 3, of the Wyoming
Constitution and/or section I of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution.
4. Reserved questions reach the Wyoming Supreme Court under the provisions
of section 1-13-101 of the Wyoming Statutes. WYo. STAT. § 1-13-101 (1977)
provides:
When an important and difficult constitutional question arises in a
proceeding pending before the district court on motion of either party or
upon his own motion the judge of the district court may cause the question
to be reserved and sent to the supreme court for its decision.
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the equal protection challenge raised by Galesburg and decided the appropriate standard of review was that of traditional scrutiny.' The court held that section 9-8-302 of the
Wyoming Statutes served a legitimate state interest and
that the preference given resident bidders was rationally
related to that interest.' The court held that, as applied to
Galesburg, section 9-8-302 of the Wyoming Statutes was
constitutional."
This Note will begin with a discussion of equal protection analysis and a brief review of the legislative history and
legal treatment afforded section 9-8-302. A discussion of
the analysis employed by the Wyoming Supreme Court will
follow. The Note will conclude with a critique of the court's
analysis and an assessment of the significance of this case in
regard to future equal protection litigation.
BACKGROUND

Equal Protection Analysis
Section 9-8-302 of the Wyoming Statutes classifies bidders on public works projects into two basic categoriesresidents and nonresidents. State statutes which make use
of classifications have typically been judicially reviewed under the equal protection clause8 of the fourteenth amendment.' The United States Supreme Court has developed two

5.
6.
7.
8.

The supreme court will not consider the question unless the district
judge has complied with the preliminary fact-finding matters described in
Rule 52(c) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.
Galesburg Constr. Co., Inc. of Wyo. v. Board of Trustees of Memorial Hosp.
of Converse County, 641 P.2d 745, 749 (Wyo. 1982).
Id. at 750.
Id. at 751.
The equal protection clause is found in the last clause of section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV, § 1 provides:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
9. Classifications created by federal statutes are challenged as being violative
of the due process protections guaranteed by the fifth amendment. Although there is no explicit equal protection clause in the fifth amendment,
the Court has recognized that it has an equal protection component. Vance
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 94 n.1 (1979). Therefore, the Court will subject
classifications made by either state or federal statutes to an identical equal
protection analysis.
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main levels of analysis to evaluate legislation challenged on
equal protection grounds. 0 The Court has adopted a standard of strict scrutiny when the challenged legislation burdens a fundamental right or creates a suspect classification.1'
Under strict scrutiny, a statute passes as constitutional only
if it is narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest.2 Absent a fundamental right or suspect classification,
the Court imposes the standard of traditional scrutiny"
which requires only that the challenged legislation be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 4 Compared to the
standard of strict scrutiny, traditional scrutiny is obviously
a much easier standard to meet. This two-tiered equal protection analysis has been adopted by the Wyoming Supreme
Court 5 and was applied by the court in the Galesburg
decision.
When the United States Supreme Court has applied traditional scrutiny to ordinary economic or social legislation,
the usual result has been to validate the legislation." The
Court has consistently refused to invalidate economic legislation under traditional scrutiny analysis even though the
Justices may have personally believed the legislation was unwise or inartfully drawn." The basic approach has been one
of deference to the judgment of the legislature. The Court's
deference to legislative judgment was recently highlighted by
its decision in United States Railroad Retirement Board v.
5 In Fritz, rather than looking for the actual motives
Fritz."
10. Recently scholars have pointed to a third level of scrutiny-intermediate
scrutiny. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-30 (1978); Fox,
Equal ProtectionAnalysis: Laurence Tribe, The Middle Tier, and the Role
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

of the Court, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 525 (1980).
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981).
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
Also referred to as lower level scrutiny or rational basis scrutiny.
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981).
Washakie County School Dist. Number One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333
(Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).

16. The Court's deference to legislative judgment in this area since the late
1930's is highlighted by the fact that the Court has invalidated economic
regulations solely on equal protection grounds only once. Morey v. Doud,
354 U.S. 457 (1957). Later the Court rejected the analysis in Morey and
overruled the decision. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). See
Barrett, The Rational Basis Standard for Equal Protection Review of
Ordinary Legislative Classifications, 68 KY. L.J. 845, 860-861 (1980).
17. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980).
18. 449 U.S. 166 (1980). In Fritz, the constitutionality of a section of the
Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 was challenged. 45 U.S.C. § 231 (Supp.
IV 1980). Congress had restructured the railroad retirement system in
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of Congress, the Court hypothesized conclusions Congress
could have drawn or assumptions Congress could have made
to reach its conclusion that plausible reasons existed for the
classification scheme that Congress chose.1" This extreme
willingness to defer to legislative judgment has generated
much debate regarding the proper scope of traditional scrutiny."0 In fact, in Fritz, separate opinions revealed that the
individual Justices could be characterized as favoring one
of three approaches. First, the majority was satisfied that
the classifications chosen by Congress were reasonable because plausible reasons existed for making such classifications.2 ' The Court was willing to find those reasons from
conclusions or assumptions Congress could have drawn.
Under this approach it would be almost impossible for a
statute not to pass traditional scrutiny. Second, Justice
Stevens, in a concurring opinion, argued that the Constitution required more than just a conceivable or plausible explanation for the statutorily unequal treatment.2 3 He argued
that there must be a correlation between the classification
and either the actual articulated legislative purpose or a
legitimate purpose that could reasonably have motivated an
impartial legislature. 4 Third, Justice Brennan, in his dis-

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

hopes of returning the retirement fund to a sound financial basis. In the
past, several workers had been able to qualify for a windfall retirement
benefit. For example, a person who had worked for more than ten years
in the railroad industry and for more than ten years in another industry,
qualified for both railroad retirement and social security benefits. As a
result, he could receive larger monthly benefits than if he had worked
solely for the railroad industry a corresponding number of years. In an
effort to reduce the number of workers who qualified for the windfall
benefit, Congress divided all railroad employees into various groups.
Some workers would be allowed to obtain the extra benefits, others
would not. For example, an individual with more than ten years of
railroad service plus sufficient non-railroad employment to qualify for
social security benefits could collect the windfall if he had worked for
the railroad in 1974. But, another individual with 24 years of railroad
employment plus sufficient time in non-railroad employment to qualify
for social security benefits, but who had not worked in the railroad industry in 1974, could not collect the benefits. A class action suit was
brought to challenge the legislation on the grounds that it irrationally
distinguished between classes of annuitants. For a further discussion of
Fritz, see, Note, Minimum Security in Equal Protection, 95 HARv. L. REV.
152-61 (1981).
449 U.S. at 178-79.
See Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1
(1981); Barrett, supra note 16.
449 U.S. at 179.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 180 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 181-82 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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sent, criticized the majority for relying on post hoc suggestions to determine the purpose of the legislation.25 He characterized the approach of the majority as mere tautology as
it presumed the purpose of the legislation from the classifications used by Congress.20 Brennan argued that the actual
purpose of a statute, as articulated by the legislative body,
must be discovered and that the chosen classification must
be rationally related to the articulated purpose and not
merely to a plausible or conceivable purpose.27
Continued disagreement as to the proper scope of rational basis analysis was found in the decision of Schweiker
v. Wilson.2" The majority continued to apply the general
standard of requiring that classifications used in a statute
be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. However, the language chosen in the opinion appeared to be less
deferential as the majority stressed that the rational basis
standard was not toothless and that the classificatory scheme
should advance a reasonable and identifiable governmental
objective." Despite the stronger language, the Court again
deferred to legislative judgment and validated the legislation. Four justices dissented and argued that when an explicit legislative statement of the purpose to be furthered by
the legislation was not available, a higher level of analysis
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 184 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 184 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
450 U.S. 221 (1981). The issue in Schweiker was whether Congress could
constitutionally decline to grant Supplemental Security Income benefits to
a class of otherwise eligible individuals because they were institutionalized
in public mental institutions that did not receive Medicaid funds for their
care. Id. at 222. Congress had amended the Social Security Act in 1972
to create the federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. A
portion of the SSI program was challenged as being violative of the equal
protection component of the fifth amendment's due process clause. Two
main arguments were advanced on behalf of the class excluded from the
benefits. First, the exclusion of the class (mentally ill who resided in
institutions that did not receive Medicaid funds) bore no reasonable relationship to any legitimate objective of the SSI program. Id. at 226. Second,
the members of the excluded class should be considered a suspect class,
which would require that Congress show special justification for excluding
them from the benefits. Id. at 226-27. The Court determined that the
suspect class issue was irrelevant because the classification was not based
on mental illness, but upon the type of institution where the patient resided.
Id. at 231. The Court then applied traditional scrutiny and determined that
Congress had acted reasonably in denying supplemental benefits to the
excluded group. Id. at 239.
29. Id. at 234.
30. Id. at 234-35.
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should be applied. 1 Absent a clearly stated legislative purpose, the dissenters maintained that the classification should
bear a "fair and substantial relation" to any post hoc suggestion of the purpose which is not supported by legislative
history."2
The United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz
and Schweiker v. Wilson decisions indicated a struggle and
some dissatisfaction within the Court regarding the appropriate application of traditional scrutiny. However, the
prevailing position at the conclusion of the Court's 1980
Term was still one of great deference to legislative judgment
in the areas of social and economic legislation.
This controversy was rekindled during the 1981 Term.
The decisions of Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.

83

and Zobel

Williams 4

v.
demonstrated that the Court was moving toward a less deferential role when engaging in traditional
scrutiny. In Logan, although the constitutional claim was
based on both due process and equal protection challenges,
the statute in question was held invalid because it deprived
the plaintiff of property without due process of law. How31. Id. at 244-45 (Powell, J., dissenting).
32. Id.
33 .. U--....
, 102 S.Ct. 1148 (1982). Logan had been dismissed from his
job and filed a complaint alleging unlawful termination of employment. An
Illinois statute required that the Fair Employment Practice Commission
hold a hearing within 120 days of receiving such a complaint. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, § 858(b) (1979).
The Commission failed to hold the hearing
until the 125th day. At the hearing, Logan's employer's motion to dismiss
the claim for failure to hold a timely hearing was denied. On appeal, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the Commission had no jurisdiction to
hear the claim, thereby cutting off Logan's claim. Zimmerman Brush Co.
v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 82 Ill. 2d 99, 411 N.E.2d 277 (1980).
The Illinois court rejected Logan's arguments that his due process and
equal protection rights would be violated if the Commission's error were
allowed to extinguish his cause of action. Id., N.E.2d at 282.
34 -.......
U.S -...... , 102 S.Ct. 2309 (1982). At issue in Zobel was the constitutionality of the Alaska legislature's plan to distribute income derived from
mineral reserves to its citizens. The plan called for distributions in varying
amounts based on the length of each citizen's residence. Id. at 2310. The
recipients would receive one dividend unit (equivalent to $50.00) for each
year of residency since 1959. Thus, for the 1979 fiscal year, a one-year
resident would receive $50.00 and a person who had been a resident of
Alaska since 1959 would receive $1,050.00. The statute was challenged as
being violative of equal protection guarantees and the constitutional right
of interstate migration. The Alaska Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 2311.
35. 102 S.Ct. at 1159. The Court held that Logan was not granted an appropriate hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner and,
therefore, his due process rights were violated. Id. The question having
been decided on the due process claim, the Court's opinion did not address
the equal protection challenge.
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ever, the equal protection issue was addressed in a separate
opinion"0 and a concurring opinion."' Logan was significant
because it marked the first modern case in which a majority
of the justices agreed that a statute should be held unconstitutional under the rational basis standard."
In Zobel, the Court held that a distribution scheme advanced by the Alaska legislature did not pass traditional
scutiny. 0 The state had advanced three purposes to be furthered by the legislation."0 The Court found that the purpose
of rewarding citizens for past contributions was not a legitimate state interest.41 The Court then found that the purposes
of creating a financial incentive to establish and maintain
residence in Alaska and of furthering the prudent management of the Permanent Fund were not rationally related to
the distinctions that Alaska sought to make between newer
residents and those who had been in the state since 1959.42
The Court held that the Alaska distribution plan violated the
guarantees of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment."
The purpose of this section has been to demonstrate the
changing nature of traditional scrutiny as it is applied by
the Supreme Court to evaluate challenges to legislative classifications raised under equal protection guarantees. Lawyers involved in equal protection litigation should pay close
36. Id. at 1159 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion). The separate opinion was
written by Justice Blackmun who was also the author of the opinion for the
Court. Three justices joined Justice Blackmun in finding that the state's
identified purposes of eliminating employment discrimination and protecting employers from unfounded charges of discrimination were not advanced
by the deadilne provision. Id. at 1160. They felt that the statute, in effect,
created two classifications of workers who filed complaints: Those who
were given a hearing within 120 days and those who were not. Id. at 1159.
37. Id. at 1161 (concurring opinion). Justices Powell and Rehnquist would not
join in the separate opinion, but they too felt that the state created classifications did not bear a rational relationship to legitimate governmental
objectives.
38. BARRETT AND COHEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 116 (6th ed. Supp. 1982).
39. 102 S.Ct. at 2315.
40. Id. at 2313. The three purposes included: (a) creation of a financial incentive for individuals to establish and maintain residence in Alaska; (b) encouragement of prudent management of the Permanent Fund; and (c)
apportionment of benefits in recognition of undefined contributions of
various kinds, both tangible and intangible, which residents have made during their years of residency. Id.
41. Id. at 2314.
42. Id. at 2313-14.
43. Id. at 2315.
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attention to forthcoming Supreme Court decisions in the
equal protection area.
History and Treatment of Section 9-8-302
The original version of section 9-8-302 of the Wyoming
Statutes was adopted by the Wyoming Legislature in 1939.7
Since that time, no changes have been made in the language
of the statute. The original version of section 9-8-301 of the
Wyoming Statutes, which contains definitions to be applied
to section 9-8-302, was also enacted in 1939." The statute
was amended to its current form in 1961.4
The constitutionality of sections 9-8-301"' and 9-8-302"s
was raised in Harding v. State.4" The plaintiffs in Harding
were partners in a Utah partnership. They had submitted a
bid to do the mechanical work on the new Evanston High
School to the general contractor who had been awarded the
job. The contractor had applied sections 9-8-301 and 9-8-302
and given preference to Wyoming bidders which resulted in
a rejection of the bid offered by the Utah partnership. The
Wyoming Supreme Court refused to consider the claim of
the Utah partnership that sections 9-8-301 and 9-8-302 violated article I, section 650 of the Wyoming Constitution and
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
44. 1939 Wyo. SESS. LAWS Ch. 50., § 1.
45. 1939 Wyo. SaSS. LAWS Ch. 50., § 4:
As used in this Act the word "resident" means: Any person who shall
have been a bona fide resident of the state for one (1) year or more immediately prior to bidding upon the contract; a partnership or association,
each member of which shall have been a bona fide resident of the state
for one (1) year or more immediately prior to bidding lipon the contract;
a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Wyoming.
46. 1961 Wyo. SESS. LAWS Ch. 152., § 1. See supra note 1 for the current version of the statute. A number of additional amendments were also considered by the 1961 legislature. One in particular is worth noting. It
would have added the following language to the current version of section
9-8-301: "provided, however, that any corporation formed by persons who
are bona fide residents of the State for one year or more immediately prior
to bidding upon a contract and the corporate stock of which is owned in
full by such bona fide residents shall be included within the meaning of the
word 'resident'." DIGEST OF JOURNALS, 36th Legislature 65 (1961). This
amendment was accepted by the House on second reading, but struck on
the third reading. Id.
47. Then codified as Wyo. STAT. § 9-663 (1957).
48. Then codified as Wyo. STAT. § 9-664 (1957).
49. 478 P.2d 64 (Wyo. 1970).
50. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law."
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the United States Constitution." The court observed that
the plaintiffs had dealt with the general contractor; there
was no allegation that the contractor was an agent of the
state or any subdivision of the state.2 Thus, the partnership
had not been connected with a contract being let by the state
or any subdivision thereof.5 3 Therefore, the court held that
they lacked standing to raise the constitutional issue."
The constitutionality of the statute was also addressed
in an opinion by the Wyoming Attorney General." The
attorney general56 concluded that the statutes were constitutional and that the legislature was at liberty to encourage
local industry by such means. 7
Statutes which give a preference to resident bidders and
also include a durational residency requirement are very
rare. The only other state to have a similar requirement is
Montana.5" There has been some litigation of statutes which
give preference to resident bidders" but no cases can be
found that have fully litigated a constitutional challenge to
a preference statute which also included a durational residency requirement.
THE Galesburg DECISION

The Wyoming Supreme Court's Analysis
Galesburg's question to the Wyoming Supreme Court
included claims under both the federal and state constitutions.6" The court immediately limited its analysis to the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

478 P.2d at 65.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.
49 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 236 (1963).
The Wyoming Attorney General at the time was John Raper, now an associate justice of the Wyoming Supreme Court and author of the Galesburg
opinion.
57. OiP. ATT'Y GEN., supra note 55, at 240.
58.

MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 18-1-102 to -103 (1981).

59. Equitable Shipyards, Inc. v. State, 611 P.2d 396 (Wash. 1980). The Washington Supreme Court held that a Washington statute which gave resident
shipbuilders a six percent bidding preference did not violate equal protection guarantees.
60. See supra note 3.
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Galesburg had not presented arguments on the state constitutional grounds for its claims in its brief." The court then
decided that Galesburg's challenge must be analyzed under
the two-tiered equal protection-due process analysis 2 developed by the United States Supreme Court. 3 Galesburg had
argued that strict scrutiny should be applied;64 the state
contended that lower level scrutiny was appropriate." The
court rejected the position of Galesburg and stated that, although strict scrutiny had been applied to cases where fundamental rights such as the rights of travel or voting were
at issue, these same fundamental rights had never been extended to corporations under the fourteenth amendment.0
The court also determined that Galesburg was not a member
of a suspect class, again concluding that such status had
never been extended to corporations."7 Satisfied that no fundamental right had been burdened and that no suspect class
was involved, the court refused to apply strict scrutiny. 8
The court then analyzed section 9-8-302 under the
rational basis standard." The court determined that the
61. 641 P.2d at 748.
62. The court's wording here is confusing as it implies that the Supreme Court
applies the same test when reviewing all equal protection and due process
challenges, which is not accurate. What the court probably meant was that
the Supreme Court applies the same standard of review when challenges
are based on statutory classifications, whether the statute is state or federal. See supra note 9.
63. 641 P.2d at 748.
64. Brief for Plaintiff at 14, Galesburg Constr. Co., Inc. v. Board of Trustees
of Memorial Hosp. of Converse County, 641 P.2d 745 (Wyo. 1982). Galesburg cited numerous cases in which durational residency requirements were
subjected to strict scrutiny including, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
65. Brief for Defendant at 7, Galesburg Constr. Co., Inc. v. Board of Trustees
of Memorial Hosp. of Converse County, 641 P.2d 745 (Wyo. 1982). The
state contended that corporations were inherently different from natural
parsons for the purpose of equal protection analysis.
66. 641 P.2d at 749. The court also looked to the language of the fourteenth
amendment to conclude that corporations did not possess the fundamental
right of travel. The court stated that the language of the fourteenth
amendment "seemingly excludes corporation" by referring to all persons
born or naturalized in the United States. The court's conclusion is at least
misleading, if not entirely contrary to precedent, as corporations have been
recognized as persons afforded equal protection by the United States
Supreme Court. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780
n.15 (1978) (citing Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S.
894 (1886); Covington & Lexington Turnpike R. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S.
578 (1896)). However, no case can be found which stands for the proposition that the right to travel extends to corporations.
67. 641 P.2d at 749.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 750.
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purpose of the legislation was "to encourage local industry,"
relying heavily on an Attorney General's Opinion 0 written
in 1963. 7' The court held that the state interest in encouraging local industry was legitimate.7 2 The court then held that
the statute as drawn was rationally related to the advancement of the state interest.7 1 In support of its decision, the
court reasoned that the statute increased the likelihood that
Wyoming bidders would be awarded contracts, thereby encouraging local industry.74 The opinion also pointed out that
the state would benefit as the money payable under the contract was more likely to remain in the state."5
Galesburg also advanced a number of reasons for declaring section 9-8-302 unconstitutional as contrary to public
policy. 76 The court rejected the argument and correctly declared that public policy was not a reason for declaring a
statute unconstitutional when the legislature had already
acted on the matter.7
Justice Rooney wrote a dissenting opinion in Galesburg.7' He argued that the constitutionality of section 9-8301 should also have been considered by the court since that
section defined the terms used in section 9-8-302. 71 In addition, he raised concerns about possible arbitrary and capricious applications of these statutes that he felt would be
violative of the constitutional provisions set forth in the
question reserved to the court.8 0 He did not believe that the
state interest in encouraging local industry was furthered
when a long-time Wyoming resident was penalized as a
bidder simply because he exercised his privilege to do business as a corporation within the year previous to the bid.8
70. See supra note 55.
71. 641 P.2d at 750.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

76. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 64, at 20-28.
77. 641 P.2d at 750.
78. Id. at 751 (Rooney, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 752 (Rooney, J., dissenting).

80. Id. at 751 (Rooney, J., dissenting).
81. Id. Under section 9-8-301 if a long-time Wyoming resident formed a corporation, the corporation would be classified as a nonresident for bidding
purposes for one year.
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Justice Rooney concluded by stating that he would hold the
statute unconstitutional because it denied equal protection
to long-time Wyoming residents to do business as corporations within a year previous to the bids referred to in the
statute.
Critique and Implications
A significant point which must be made about the Galesburg decision is that the court ultimately considered a very
narrow question. Only section 9-8-302 was evaluated and
then only under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. The court refused to consider the challenges under the Wyoming constitutional provisions83 because they were not fully presented
and argued to the court.8 4 This refusal is fully in line with
precedent."
The court also did not consider the constitutionality of
section 9-8-301.o This decision by the court effectively ruined any chance that Galesburg had of prevailing in the case
because the court then did not have to consider the classifications created by 9-8-301 or the one-year durational residency
requirement. Justice Rooney criticized the court's refusal
to evaluate section 9-8-301; he argued that section 9-8-301
had to be examined to determine the constitutionality of
section 9-8-302.11 The justice cited several cases to support
his position. However, they all focused on the proper inter82. Id. at 752 (Rooney, J., dissenting).
83. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides:

Since equality in the enjoyment of natural and civil rights is only
made sure through political equality, the laws of this state affecting the
political rights and privileges of its citizens-shall be without distinction of
race, color, sex, or any circumstances or condition whatsoever other than
individual incompetency, or unworthiness duly ascertained by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
WYo. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law."
84. 641 P.2d at 748.
85. Salt Creek Transp. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 37 Wyo. 488, 263 P. 621,
622 (1928).
86. 641 P.2d at 750 n.10.
87. Id. at 752 (Rooney, J., dissenting).
88. Kuntz v. Kinne, 395 P.2d 286 (Wyo. 1964); Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62
(Wyo. 1962); Stringer v. Board of County Comm'nrs of Big Horn County,
347 P.2d 197 (Wyo. 1959).
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pretation or construction to be given a particular statute and
none of the cases involved a constitutional challenge. Though
one could characterize the majority's position as rigid and
formalistic, the position is probably justified when one considers the importance of a constitutional challenge. Generally, there is a strong presumption in favor of constitutionality, and the Wyoming Supreme Court has specifically stated
that a statute will be presumed to be constitutional unless
the party mounting the challenge proves otherwise."9 Galesburg damaged its case a great deal by not explicitly including section 9-8-301 in the question reserved to the court. If
section 9-8-301 had been before the court, the rational basis
analysis of the court would have been more extensive as
several additional elements would have been before the court
for examination, including the one-year durational residency
requirement and the potentially irrational application of the
statute to long-time Wyoming residents who form corporations and bid on public contracts within one year.
The court realized that the choice of level of scrutiny
would play a key role in the outcome of the case." The court
correctly concluded that Galesburg, as a corporation, had not
put forth sufficient arguments to justify subjecting section
9-8-302 to strict scrutiny. There is judicial support for the
proposition that corporations are to be considered persons
afforded protection under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.9 Relying on this protection, Galesburg tried to subject section 9-8-302 to strict scrutiny on
the basis of the one-year durational residency requirement
found in 9-8-301. Galesburg cited a number of cases where
courts had subjected durational residency requirements to
strict scrutiny because the requirements had burdened the
fundamental rights of travel or voting.9" The court pointed
out that the cases cited by Galseburg dealt with fundamental
rights that were extended to individuals." No cases can be
Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904, 910 (Wyo. 1980).
641 P.2d at 748.
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 n.15 (1978) (citing
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) ; Covington & Lexington Turnpike R. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578 (1896)).
92. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 64, at 12-14.
93. 641 P.2d at 749.
89.
90.
91.
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found with holdings that stand for the proposition that corporations possess the fundamental right to travel. Absent
any authority, the Wyoming Supreme Court was not willing
to extend the right of travel to a corporation.14 Since Galesburg had not met its burden of demonstrating that a corporation was entitled to the right of travel, the court correctly
disposed of the argument. Since Galesburg could not demonstrate that a fundamental right had been burdened with
respect to itself, or present evidence that it was a member
of a suspect classification, the court properly moved to the
lower level of analysis, traditional scrutiny.
Under traditional scrutiny, a statute will be validated
if the court determines that the statute serves a legitimate
state interest and that the statute is rationally related to
advancing that interest." In its analysis, the Wyoming Supreme Court attempted to follow guidelines prescribed by
the United States Supreme Court. However, one must question the court's reliance on the 1957 case of Morey v. Doud9
to summarize the recognized testing criteria. Morey was
overruled in 1976.17 The background section of this Note
highlighted the present controversy within the United States
Supreme Court regarding the proper scope of traditional
scrutiny. The court should have demonstrated a present
awareness of the Supreme Court's approach by citing the
most recent cases available to the court at the time of the
Galesburg opinion. It should be pointed out that due to the
limited inquiry in this case, even applying the present criteria
followed by the United States Supreme Court, the Wyoming
Supreme Court would not have reached a different result in
this case.
The court's attempt to determine the purpose of the
legislation focused attention on a problem faced by Wyoming
courts. Due to the inadequacy of records preserving the his94. Id. The court reasoned that a corporation, as a fictitious entity, was not
capable of traveling.
95. See supra text accompanying notes C-59.
96. 354 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1957).
97. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976). The Court concluded that
the equal protection analysis in the Morey opinion should no longer be
followed.
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tory of legislation, it is difficult to determine the interest
sought to be advanced by a legislative enactment. The problem is usually solved if a preamble explaining purposes is
included with the statute or if full records of committee
meetings or debate on the floor concerning the legislation are
available. Since they often lack this information, Wyoming
courts are forced to speculate on the purpose of legislation
or to rely on post hoc suggestions of purpose. In Galesburg,
the court gave no indication that it had searched legislative
records to determine the purposes of section 9-8-302. However, it is very likely that no such records existed. For
whatever reason, the court identified the legislative purpose
without mentioning the aid of legislative records. 8 It determined that the likely purpose of section 9-8-302 was to encourage local industry.99 This conclusion was reached on the
basis of the 1963 Attorney General's Opinion that was discussed earlier.'01 The court observed that the opinion should
be given weight as it had withstood the test of time.'0 ' That
conclusion is certainly debatable as the opinion may or may
not have had anything to do with the lack of legislative action.
In defense of the court, reliance on the Attorney General's
Opinion is probably much better than relying solely on post
hoc suggestions of purposes presented in oral arguments.
Such sources present at least a thoughtful analysis of the
purpose of legislation at a time much closer to the enactment
of the legislation than the present. Also, in this instance, it
is difficult to conceive of any other purpose that could be
furthered by the statute. Therefore, the court's analysis in
determining the legislative purpose of section 9-8-302, is
probably in line with the Supreme Court directive that the
purpose must be reasonable and identifiable."'
98. The dissent pointed to a House action on a proposed amendment to section
9-8-301 (set out supra at note 46) to indicate that the legislature may not
have intended to promote local industry, at least not in regard to newly
formed corporations. 641 P.2d at 752 (Rooney, J., dissenting). The rejection of the proposed amendment certainly leads to some confusion as to the
actual purpose of 9-8-301 and presumably the purpose of 9-8-302. However, the amendment was considered only by the House and the record gives
no indication of why the amendment was proposed or why it was defeated.
Since the court restricted its analysis to section 9-8-302 it may have felt
justified in ignoring the legislative history of 9-8-301.
99. 641 P.2d at 750.
100. See supra note 55.
101. 641 P.2d at 750 n.9.
102. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981).
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Once the court was able to identify a legitimate state
interest, it quickly determined that the classifications included in the statute were rationally related to advancing
the state interest in encouraging local industry.' ° Given the
limited nature of the court's inquiry and United States Supreme Court precedent in the equal protection area, such a
conclusion was proper. Obviously, awarding a preference
to a resident bidder rather than a nonresident will increase
the probability that a local bidder will be awarded the contract, thus promoting local industry.
If the constitutional challenge had also included section
9-8-301 the court would have had to deal with the variety of
definitions of resident, the one-year durational residency requirement, and the possibility of irrational applications which
were proposed in the dissent. The analysis would have been
much more extensive and the possibility of Galesburg prevailing much greater.
In its brief, Galesburg had argued that section 9-8-302
created two classes of bidders when the definitional sections
of section 9-8-301 were applied. 0 4 In fact, a better argument would have been to claim that the statutes, in effect,
created three classifications. First, a class of Wyoming residents who have lived in the state for more than a year and
who have chosen to do business as a sole proprietorship or as
a partner in a partnership. Also included in the first class
would be corporations organized under the laws of Wyoming
which have been in existence for more than a year and have
their principal office and place of business in Wyoming,
which are all classified as residents for bidding purposes. The
second class would consist of Wyoming residents who have
lived in the state for more than a year and have decided to
do business in the form of a corporation, yet who are clas103. 641 P.2d at 750.
104. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 64, at 15-16. The first class consisted of
individuals, partners, or corporations that have been residents of or been
organized under the laws of Wyoming for more than one (1) year. The
second class consisted of individuals, partners or corporations who are not
residents or are not organized under the laws of Wyoming and individuals,
partners or corporations who are residents or have been organized under
Wyoming law but have not been so for a period of more than one (1) year.
Id.
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sified as nonresidents for bidding purposes until the corporation has been in existence for more than one year. The
third class would include out-of-state persons and corporations who have not lived in Wyoming for more than a year or
have not been incorporated in Wyoming or, if incorporated
in Wyoming, have not been in existence for a year, who are
classified as nonresidents for bidding purposes.
For a statute to pass traditional scrutiny the classifications chosen by the legislature must be rationally related to
the advancement of a legitimate state interest. In the Galesburg decision, the Wyoming Supreme Court identified the
purpose of the questioned statute to be the promotion of local
industry, which the court concluded was a legitimate purpose. The following hypothetical examples will illustrate
that it is questionable that the second classification outlined above is rationally related to the advancement of the
state interest in promoting local industry." 5
Assume that X has lived and done business in Wyoming
for 25 years. Eleven months prior to submitting a bid on a
construction project to be let by the state, X decides to do
business as a corporation wholly owned by him. X submits
a bid for $5,200,000.00 in the name of the corporation. Assume that Y is an out-of-state builder who bids $5,000,000.00
on the same project. 0 6 Although X's bid is not more than
five percent greater than Y's bid, Y will be awarded the
contract as the low bidder because both bidders will be considered nonresidents for bidding purposes under the statutes.
Local industry is clearly not promoted in this example.
Now assume that A and B are long-time Wyoming residents. They had been partners in a partnership for 20 years,
but the partnership was dissolved six months ago. A has
entered into another partnership with C, who is also a longtime Wyoming resident. B has formed a corporation which
is wholly owned by him and incorporated under Wyoming
105. Please assume that all of the parties in the following examples are responsible bidders.
106. X's bid exceeded Y's bid by four percent.
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law. D is an out-of-state builder. All three parties bid on a
construction project to be awarded by the state of Wyoming.
The bid of the A-C partnership is $5,240,000.00, the bid of
D is $5,200,000.00 and the bid of B's corporation is
$5,000.000.00.1°? For bidding purposes, under sections 9-8301 and 9-8-302, the A-C partnership will be considered a
resident, while B's corporation and D will be considered nonresidents. The A-C partnership will be awarded the bid because its bid did not exceed the bid of the nonresident bidders by more than five percent. In this example, since a
local bidder will be awarded the contract, the state interest in promoting local industry is advanced. However, if
B's corporation had been considered a resident, a local
bidder would have been awarded the contract at a savings
of $240,000.00 to the taxpayers. Again, this hypothetical
illustrates a situation where the rationality of the classification is questionable.
Given the apparent trend toward the less deferential
application of equal protection traditional scrutiny, illustrated by the cases of Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and
Zobel v. Williams, an equal protection challenge under the
fourteenth amendment in the situations illustrated above
might be successful.. However, even if a fourteenth amendment challenge fails, a statute might still be declared unconstitutional on the basis of a challenge to a provision in the
state constitution. The Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized that the Wyoming Constitution's version of the right
to equal protection is found in section 34 of article 11 of the
Wyoming Constitution.10 9 It is important to raise constitutional challenges on state constitutional grounds because the
court has recognized that, "[a] state may enlarge rights under the Fourteenth Amendment announced by the Supreme
Court of the United States, which are considered minimal,
and thus a state constitutional provision may be more demanding than the equivalent federal constitutional provi107. A-C's bid exceeded D's by less than one percent and B's by 4.8%. D's bid
exceeded B's by four percent.
108. WYo. CONST. art. I, § 34 provides:
"All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation."
109. Washakie County School Dist. Number One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 332
(Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
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sion. ' 11O The Wyoming Supreme Court has, on occasion, invalidated a statute on state constitutional grounds that it
had held to be valid under the fourteenth amendment equal
protection clause."' It is, therefore, very important to raise
such challenges, especially in equal protection cases that will
not be based on strict scrutiny, due to the deference that will
generally be accorded legislative judgment.
CONCLUSION

Galesburg provides many lessons for future equal protection challenges to legislative classifications. Constitutional
challenges should be broad. All of the statutory sections involved, including merely definitional sections, should be explicitly included in the question presented to the court. Challenges based on state constitutional provisions should also be
raised. If they are raised in the question, they should be
fully argued in the brief and before the court. Even if the
challenge under the federal constitution fails, the statute
may still be invalidated on state constitutional grounds.
JOHN J. METZKE

110. Id.
111. Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 76 (Wyo. 1978). The court said:
While because of applicable federal authorities we are precluded from any finding except constitutionality for the guest
statute under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, such a conclusion is by no means restrictive of what
we may find under our own constitutional mandate, even though
both provisions may have the same overall end in view.
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